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PROTECTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
OF MINORITY YOUTH ON RIKERS ISLAND 
LORETTA A. JOHNSON* 
In 2014, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York released a 
report on their investigation into the patterns and practices of treatment of adolescent inmates on 
Rikers Island, finding systemic defects that result in the pervasive violation of the adolescent inmates’ 
constitutional rights.  Ninety-five percent of the adolescent population on Rikers is Black or Latino. 
New York is uniquely harsh with its treatment of 16- and 17-year-olds, as it and North Carolina 
are the only states to set the minimum age of criminal responsibility at 16.  Over seventy-five percent 
of youth on Rikers Island are awaiting trial and have not been convicted of a crime. The prevalence 
of the unconstitutional conduct on Rikers Island is attributable, in large part, to the lack of 
accountability among Department of Corrections (DOC) staff members on Rikers Island, which 
results in a code of silence.  To effectively deal with the pervasive pattern and practice of conduct on 
the part of DOC staff that violates adolescent inmates on Rikers Island’s constitutional rights, it is 
crucial to understand the differences between adolescents and adults and the power of the DOC staff 
union.  This Note posits that in order to create meaningful reform and protect the constitutional 
rights of adolescent inmates, the cut-off age for criminal responsibility should be raised so that 16- 
and 17-year-olds fall under the jurisdiction of the Family Court and are not placed on Rikers 
Island.  Additionally, the portion of the Administrative Code requiring all uniformed DOC ranks 
to be filled by promotion from within the uniformed force must be amended to obstruct the code of 
silence and prevent violence against inmates.  Without such measures, the abuses against minority 
youth on Rikers Island will persist. 
I.	 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 50	
II.	 THE REPORT ON THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION 
ADOLESCENT JAILS ON RIKERS ISLAND .......................................................... 53	
A.	 The Constitutional Rights of Inmates: The Eighth Amendment ...... 53	
B.	 Federal Authority: The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 1997; Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 ..................................................................... 54	
C.	 The Report .......................................................................................... 55	
1.	 DOC Staff Members Use Force Excessively and Unnecessarily Resulting in a 
High Frequency of Inmate Violence ................................................................... 55	
2.	 The DOC System Contains Universal Deficits Resulting in a High Frequency of 
Inmate Violence ................................................................................................. 56	
3.	 The Rikers Island Adolescent Jails Have Excessive and Inappropriate Use of 
Extended Punitive Segregation ........................................................................... 58	
4.	 The Report’s Conclusion .................................................................................... 59	
2015 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW  49 
 
 49 
III.	 THE FEDERAL LAWSUIT’S ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY REFORM THE CULTURE OF 
VIOLENCE ON RIKERS ISLAND ADOLESCENT JAILS IS LIMITED BY THE POWER OF 
COBA ............................................................................................................... 60	
A.	 Outcomes of Institutional Reform Litigation ..................................... 60	
B.	 The Nunez v. City of New York Settlement Agreement .................... 61	
1.	 Appointment of an Independent Monitor ............................................................ 61	
2.	 Creation of a New Use of Force Policy, Reporting Requirements and Improvements 
in Use of Force Incident Investigations ................................................................ 61	
3.	 Increased Staff Member Accountability ............................................................... 62	
4.	 Increased Video Surveillance of Jails ................................................................... 63	
5.	 Improved Tracking Systems and the Development of EWS ................................ 63	
6.	 Improvements in Staff Member Training ............................................................ 63	
7.	 Provisions for Adolescent Inmates ....................................................................... 64	
C.	 Limitations of the Nunez v .  Ci ty  o f  New York  Institutional Reform 
Litigation and the Power of COBA ..................................................... 64	
1.	 Failure of Recent Reform Initiatives and the Long History of Lawsuits .............. 65	
2.	 The Primary Concern of Jails Hinders Reform Efforts ........................................ 65	
3.	 Disincentives on the Ground ............................................................................... 66	
4.	 Recent Promotions within the DOC Illustrate the Disincentives .......................... 66	
5.	 Disincentives from Civil Service Laws ................................................................ 67	
6.	 Disincentives from COBA and Norman Seabrook ............................................ 68	
7.	 Empathy Does Not Incentivize Reform: The Phenomenon of Black on Black 
Violence ............................................................................................................. 69	
IV.	 IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENT INMATES 
ON RIKERS ISLAND, NY PENAL LAW SECTION 30.00 AND SECTION 9-117(B) OF THE 
NEW YORK CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE MUST BE AMENDED .................... 69	
A.	 Amend New York Penal Law Section 30.00 ....................................... 70	
1.	 Proposals to Amend New York Penal Law Section 30.00 ................................ 72	
2.	 Opponents of the Amendment of New York Penal Law Sec.  30.00 .................. 73	
B.	 Amend Section 9-117(b) of the New York City Administrative Code . 74	
50 Constitutional Rights of Minority Youth on Rikers Island Vol. 6.1 
 
 50 
1.	 Opponents of the Amendment of Section 9-117(b) of the New York City 
Administrative Code .......................................................................................... 74	
2.	 Improving the Morale of DOC Staff members .................................................... 75	
V.	 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 76	
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While resting his head on a desk during class, Inmate H abruptly woke up to a correctional officer 
who was hitting him in his ribcage.1  While not ideal, sleeping in class is expected behavior for a 16- to 17-
year-old adolescent boy like Inmate H.  Yet, this behavior, along with other normal adolescent behavior, is 
often met with excessive force in adolescent jails on Rikers Island.  After jumping up to defend himself, an 
officer punched Inmate H in the eye hard enough that he fell to the floor.2  Three or four more officers 
joined, kicking Inmate H in his back, head, face and mouth while pepper spraying him an inch from his eye.3  
The teacher in the classroom saw Inmate H lying on the floor “looking dazed” and encouraged the class to 
look away.4  She heard an officer shouting at Inmate H, loud thuds, and Inmate H crying for his mother.5  
Not until four hours after the incident did anyone take Inmate H to see medical staff.6 
This incident occurred in September of 2012,7 and it is one of 200 samples of use of force incidents 
included in a report (“the Report”) released on August 4, 2014.  The report was the product of an 
investigation by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York into the patterns 
and practices of treatment of adolescent inmates on Rikers Island.8  The 200 samples illustrate the systemic 
defects that result in the violation of the adolescent inmates’ constitutional rights.9  
The prevalence of the unconstitutional conduct on Rikers Island is attributable, in large part, to the 
lack of accountability among Department of Corrections (DOC) staff members on Rikers Island, which 
                                                
* J.D. 2016, Columbia Law School; B.A. 2011, Loyola Marymount University. The author would like to thank Professor 
Jeffrey Fagan for his guidance and the staff of the Columbia Journal of Race and Law for their invaluable editing 
contributions. The author would also like to thank Judge Bryanne Hamil, member of the NYC Board of Correction, for 
introducing me to this important issue. 
1 Letter from Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Preet Bharara, U.S. Att’y for the 
S. Dist. of N.Y., Jeffrey K. Powell, Assistant U.S. Att’y, and Emily E. Daughtry, Assistant U,S, Att’y, to Bill De Blasio, 
Mayor of N.Y.C., Joseph Ponte, Comm’r of N.Y. Dep’t of Corr., and Zachary Carter, Corp. Counsel of N.Y.C. (Aug. 4, 




4 Id. at 74.  
5 Id.  
6 Id. at 72. This is a common practice referred to as “bus therapy.” According to prison officials familiar with the 
practice, officers on Rikers Island would take an inmate to the hospital shortly after an incident and drive the inmate 
around in circles for long periods of time before going to the hospital. In some cases, the hospital was only fifteen 
minutes away. See also Michael Winerip & Michael Schwirtz, Rikers: Where Mental Illness Meets Brutality in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/nyregion/rikers-study-finds-prisoners-injured-by-
employees.html?_r=0 (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
7 Id. at 72.  
8 Samuels, Bharara, Powell, & Daughtry, supra note 1, at 1. 
9 Id. at 2.  
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results in a code of silence.10  The Report concluded that DOC staff members not only insufficiently 
investigate and report use of force incidents, but also frequently falsify reports.11  The rare times DOC staff 
members are found to have used force inappropriately, they are nonetheless insufficiently disciplined.12  While 
the incident with Inmate H is representative of the common vicious practices that occur daily on Rikers, it is 
unique in that there were multiple witnesses corroborating Inmate H’s version of events, most notably 
statements from three teachers.13  Inmates, medical staff members and teachers rarely report use of force 
incidents out of fear of retribution from guards.14  Additionally, it is particularly common for excessive use of 
force incidents to occur in areas where there are no surveillance cameras, just as was the case with Inmate H, 
making it difficult to hold DOC staff members accountable.15  The lack of accountability on Rikers Island 
persists because DOC officers maintain much political clout as members of the largest municipal jail union in 
the country, the Correction Officers’ Benevolent Association (COBA).16   Moreover, they are led by a 
powerful president.17 
Institutional racism also accounts for the persistence of unconstitutional conduct on Rikers Island.18 
Ninety-five percent of the adolescent population on Rikers is Black or Latino.19 New York is uniquely harsh 
with its treatment of 16- and 17- year-olds, as it and North Carolina are the only states to set the minimum 
age of criminal responsibility at 16.20  A recent surge in the prison population over the past decades, the “War 
on Drugs,” over-policing in minority communities, racial profiling and judicial discretion leading to 
disproportionately harsh sentences for people of color, have largely resulted in a majority-minority prison 
population.21  Black males are most significantly affected, as they are two-and-a-half times more likely to be 
detained than Latino males, and six times more likely to be detained than White males.22  In 2010, two-thirds 
of the 800 16- and 17- year-olds incarcerated in New York were Black, 26 percent were Latino and 5 percent 
were White. 23   The Rikers youth population comes from disenfranchised, marginalized, low-income 
communities of color that lack political power and resources, making it easy for politicians and officials to 
ignore the abuses they experience.24  Fifty-one percent of youth on Rikers Island have been diagnosed with a 
mental illness.25  Over seventy-five percent are awaiting trial and have not been convicted of a crime,26 and 
                                                
10 See id. at 21.  
11 Id. at 4.  
12 Id.  
13 Id. at 73-74. 
14 Id. at 24-25.  
15 Id. at 20. 
16 See About Correction Officer’s Benevolent Association, CORRECTION OFFICERS’ BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
www.cobanyc.org/about-coba (last visited Feb. 27, 2014), for general information about the size, founding, and mission 
of  COBA, based in the New York City boroughs. 
17 See Michael Winerip & Michael Schwirtz, At Rikers Island, Union Chief’s Clout is a Roadblock to Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
14, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/15/nyregion/at-rikers-a-roadblock-to-
reform.html?action=click&contentCollection=N.Y.%20%2F%20Region&module=RelatedCoverage&region=Marginali
a&pgtype=article (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
18 Andrew O’Donohue, Race and Rikers, HARVARD POLITICAL REVIEW, Nov. 11, 2014, 
http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/race-rikers/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
19 Id.  
20 ELLEN YAROSHEFSKY, RETHINKING RIKERS: MOVING FROM A CORRECTIONAL TO A THERAPEUTIC MODEL FOR 
YOUTH 12 n.22 (2014). 
21 See O’Donohue, supra note 18; See also THE NEW YORK ADVISORY COMM., THE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT OF YOUTH 
IN NEW YORK: A CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION 5 (2014). 
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 6.  
24 O’Donohue, supra note 18. 
25 Samuels, Bharara, Powell, & Daughtry, supra note 1, at 6. 
26 Yaroshefsky, supra note 20, at 3. 
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the vast majority of inmates on Rikers Island have been charged with low-level offenses.27  It is common for 
youth to be sent to Rikers to wait for trial when the charges are ultimately dismissed.  For example, at 16-
years-old, Kalief Browder, was accused of stealing a backpack and spent three years on Rikers Island, of 
which two years were spent in solitary confinement.  Ultimately, he never stood trial nor was he found guilty 
of any crime.28  Browder later committed suicide after his release.29  As a result of the culture of violence on 
Rikers, many youth remain stuck there with charges resulting from incidents with guards and other inmates.30  
The racial demographics of the Rikers youth population, along with the systemic disregard for the humanity 
of such inmates, amounts to a pervasive devaluing of minority youths’ lives. 
In addition to the lack of accountability and devaluing of minority youth, the unconstitutional 
conduct at the jail also harms the public at large.  Rehabilitation rarely occurs, and the recidivism rate among 
youth is high.31  The average number of previous admissions of youth to DOC in 2013 was 1.02.32  The high 
recidivism rates also mirrors what occurs across the nation, as each year 70-80% of formerly incarcerated 
youth reoffend within 2-3 years.33  Because the culture of violence on Rikers Island harms adolescents in ways 
that hurt their future prospects, the practices of DOC staff members decrease long-term public safety 
because such practices encourage criminal behavior34—behavior oftentimes necessary for survival on Rikers 
Island.35  In addition to the lack of benefit to public safety, incarcerating youth on Rikers is costly.  Each 
adolescent inmate costs New York City taxpayers $167,000 a year.36  
The pattern of excessive and unconstitutional use of force has been going on for thirty years.37  The 
Report marked the end of a much-needed investigation and recommended the implementation of remedial 
measures to protect the constitutional rights of adolescent inmates.38  The Report warned that if there were 
no resolution within 49 days, the Attorney General would initiate a lawsuit against the city pursuant to the 
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 14141.39  In December 2014, unsatisfied 
with the city’s implementation of the Report’s remedial recommendations, the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) announced plans to join the ongoing class action, Nunez v. City of New York, as part of an effort to 
sue New York City over constitutional violations outlined in the Report.40 Nunez alleges that the systemic 
pattern and practice of unnecessary force against all inmates on Rikers Island amounts to conduct that 
violates inmates’ constitutional rights.41  In June of 2015, the City of New York agreed to settle the Nunez 
                                                
27 Dana Goldstein et al., Inside Rikers Island, Through the Eyes of the People Who Live and Work There, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, 
June 29, 2015, http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/06/inside-rikers-island-interviews.html. 
28 Michael Winerip & Michael Schwirtz, Kalief Browder, Held At Rikers Island for 3 Years Without Trial, Commits Suicide, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-island-for-3-years-
without-trial-commits-suicide.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2016).  
29 Id.  
30 O’Donohue, supra note 18. 
31 Samuels, Bharara, Powell, & Daughtry, supra note 1, at 6. 
32 Id.  
33 Yaroshefsky, supra note 20, at 3. 
34 Id. 
35 See O’Donohue, supra note 18. 
36 Yaroshefsky, supra note 20, at 3. 
37 See Jennifer Gonnerman, A Lawsuit to End Abuse at Rikers, NEW YORKER, Dec. 19, 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/lawsuit-end-abuse-rikers (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). 
38 Samuels, Bharara, Powell, & Daughtry, supra note 1, at 51. 
39 Id. at 64 
40 Jillian Jorgensen, U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara Moves to Sue City Over Violence at Rikers Island, OBSERVER, Dec. 18, 2014, 
http://observer.com/2014/12/u-s-attorney-preet-bharara-moves-to-sue-city-over-violence-at-rikers-island/ (last visited 
Feb. 27, 2014). 
41 Samuels, Bharara, Powell, & Daughtry, supra note 1, at 3 n.5. 
2015 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW  53 
 
 53 
lawsuit.42  While the DOJ’s involvement and the city’s settlement may seem like a beacon of hope for 
meaningful reform, there are limitations with proposed federal intervention and the resulting requirements of 
the settlement agreement. 
This Note argues that because of political and organizational undercurrents within the corrections 
system, and the power of COBA, the settlement of the federal lawsuit will likely create only remedial change, 
leaving the unconstitutional conduct unabated.  In order to end the culture of violence, the cut-off age for 
criminal responsibility should be raised so that 16- and 17- year-olds fall under the jurisdiction of the Family 
Court.  Additionally, the portion of the Administrative Code requiring all uniformed DOC ranks to be filled 
by promotion from within the uniformed force must be amended to prevent violence against inmates.  Part I 
provides a description of the laws surrounding inmates’ rights, federal authority and the Report.  Part II 
outlines the limitations of the federal lawsuit and the resulting settlement agreement through a discussion of 
the limitations of federal lawsuits in prison reform efforts and the power of COBA.  Part III argues that in 
order to protect the constitutional rights of adolescent inmates on Rikers Island, the New York Penal Law § 
30.00 must be amended so that adolescents are no longer criminally responsible.  This section also proposes 
amending § 9-117(b) of the city Administrative Code so that high-ranking officials in DOC can be appointed 
from outside the DOC.  The last section concludes by discussing the importance of protecting the minority 
youth on Rikers Island. 
II. THE REPORT ON THE NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION ADOLESCENT JAILS 
ON RIKERS ISLAND  
This section provides a description of the Report and investigation of the New York City DOC 
adolescent jails on Rikers Island.  First, there is a discussion of the background laws surrounding prisoners’ 
constitutional rights.  Next, there is a discussion of the laws that provide the federal authority surrounding the 
investigation and the DOJ lawsuit against New York City.  Lastly, there is a description of the Report’s 
findings.  
A. The Constitutional Rights of Inmates: The Eighth Amendment 
The Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment applies to the states through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.43  The Supreme Court has held that when someone is 
placed under the custody of a jurisdiction and detained against his will, the Eighth Amendment “imposes 
upon [the jurisdiction] a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-
being.”44  The constitution requires officers working in prisons “take reasonable measures to guarantee the 
safety of inmates.”45  Courts have required both a subjective and objective inquiry into whether prison 
officials have violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect the safety and wellbeing of inmates.46  The 
                                                
42 Benjamin Weiser, New York City Settles Suit Over Abuses at Rikers Island, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/nyregion/new-york-city-settles-suit-over-abuses-at-rikers-island.html?_r=0 (last 
visited March 10, 2016). 
43 Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
44 Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989)); see also Randle v. Alexander, 960 F. Supp. 2d 457, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
45 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984); Hayes v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(citation omitted). 
46 See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (concluding prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when two 
requirements are met). 
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subjective element requires evidence that there was “deliberate indifference” on the part of prison officials in 
protecting an inmate’s health or safety.47  
As mentioned above, 75 percent of the adolescent inmates on Rikers Island are pre-trial detainees, 
which grants them constitutional rights under standards different from convicted prisoners.48  However, 
courts have regularly held that the Eighth Amendment yields pre-trial inmates “at least those constitutional 
rights…enjoyed by convicted prisoners.”49  The Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment prohibit 
disproportionate corporeal force against prisoners and pre-trial detainees.50  Courts consider numerous 
factors to determine whether use of force was reasonably thought to be required in the circumstances.  These 
factors include the magnitude of the inmate’s injury, the necessity for the use of force, the correlation 
between the need for force and extent officials actually used force, “the threat reasonably perceived by the 
responsible officials,” and “any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response.”51  
B. Federal Authority: The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997; 
Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (“CRIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, gives the Attorney 
General, acting on behalf of the United States, discretionary authority to file a civil action against a state or its 
political subdivision for engaging in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives persons in custody at an 
institution enjoyment of rights, privileges, or immunities protected by the Constitution. 52   The term 
“institution” is defined by the Act, among other things, as a jail, prison, correctional facility or pre-trial 
detention facility.53  “Institution” is also defined as any facility or institution housing juveniles awaiting trial.54 
CRIPA gives the Attorney General subpoena authority that permits access to any document, record, 
material, file, report, memorandum, policy, procedure, investigation, video or audio recording, or quality 
assurance report relating to any institution that is subject to an investigation concerning allegations of 
unconstitutional conduct in a prison setting.55  CRIPA also provides the Attorney General with authority to 
initiate a lawsuit regarding the unconstitutional conduct if parties are unable to reach a resolution at least 49 
days after the appropriate officials have received notice of the investigation’s findings and measures necessary 
to remedy the unlawful conduct.56 
Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 similarly provides 
legal grounds to sue any government authority or agent responsible for imprisoned juveniles from 
participating in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives juveniles of their constitutional rights.57  The 
                                                
47 Id. (“Deliberate indifference” is sufficiently proven when the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to 
inmate health or safety.”) Id. at 837. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be 
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. The objective inquiry 
depends on whether the inmate, “is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 834. 
“Importantly, the objective prong can be satisfied even when no serious physical injury results.” Randle, 960 F. Supp. 2d 
at 473. 
48 Yaroshefsky, supra note 20, at 3. 
49 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979); see also Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that the 
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference test should be applied by courts to actions brought under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by pre-trial detainees); Wyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 856 (2d Cir. 1996). 
50 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832; see also United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 48 (2d Cir. 1999). 
51 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992). 
52 42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a) (2015). 
53 42 U.S.C. § 1997. 
54 Id. 
55 42 U.S.C. § 1997a-1.  
56 42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a)(1). 
57 See 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a) (2015). 
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Attorney General has authority to obtain equitable and declaratory relief through a civil action.58  The Special 
Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ is responsible for enforcing Section 14141.59 
C. The Report 
The DOJ investigated whether the DOC sufficiently protected 16- and 17- year-old inmates from 
harm.60  This inquiry was narrowed down to three sub-issues: whether DOC staff members inflict excessive 
and unnecessary force on adolescent inmates, whether adolescents on Rikers are sufficiently protected from 
other inmates, and whether adolescents suffer excessive harm from DOC’s frequent use of punitive 
segregation.61  
Rikers Island is 400 acres of land spanning the East River.62  The vast majority of the DOC’s 14,000 
average daily inmate population is managed in one of the ten facilities.63  Only one of these facilities houses 
convicted prisoners serving a year or less; the rest are pre-trial detainees.64  In 2013, there were 682 
adolescents housed on Rikers Island.65  
The timeline of the investigation was 2011 through the end of 2013.66  The DOJ looked at records 
from the DOC and the agency responsible for providing medical services to detainees on Rikers Island, the 
Department of Health and Mental Health.67  The types of records included use of force investigative files, 
inmate medical records, policies and procedures, training materials, disciplinary records, and programmatic 
materials.68  The DOJ toured Rikers Island with a consultant with expertise in corrections and use of force.69 
The DOJ interviewed inmates, staff members, senior staff members, the Commissioner, and members of the 
Board of Correction.70  The DOJ also reviewed materials from the Board of Correction and Legal Aid 
Society.71 
1. DOC Staff Members Use Force Excessively and Unnecessarily Resulting in a High 
Frequency of Inmate Violence 
The Report discussed the extraordinary frequency of violence in adolescent jails,72 and how the 
excessive and unnecessary force from staff members leads to inadequate protection for adolescent inmates.73 
This conclusion was based on the frequency of use of force with no imminent risk of injury, use of force in 
camera-free areas, and inmate-on-inmate violence.  Forty-three percent of the 705 adolescents detained in 
2012 experienced force from staff members at least once, a use of force rate higher than what the expert 
                                                
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b). 
59 Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” 
Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479, 502 (2009) (“Responsibility for enforcing Section 14141 lies with the Special 
Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.”). 
60 Samuels, Bharara, Powell, & Daughtry, supra note 1, at 1. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 5. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 6.  







73 Id. at 7. 
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consultant had ever seen.74  The Report declared that the inappropriate use of force by staff members 
amounts to a deliberate indifference to the safety of the adolescent inmate population, thereby violating the 
Eighth Amendment.75 
The DOC use of force policy states that “force may only be used ‘as a last alternative after all other 
reasonable efforts to resolve the situation have failed.’”76  The policy also requires that “the amount of force 
used at any time should always be proportional to the threat posed by the inmate at that time.” 77  
Additionally, “staff must start with the minimum amount of force needed and escalate the amount of force 
used only if the situation requires escalation.” 78   Despite this policy, staff members frequently use 
headshots—“blows to an inmate’s head or facial area”79—during situations when there is no imminent risk of 
serious physical harm.80  Abusive physical force is frequently used in response to verbal altercations, in 
response to inmates’ failure to comply with instructions and to punish or retaliate.81  Staff members 
frequently yell, “Stop resisting” to appear as if force is justified when the adolescent inmate has already been 
subdued or never resisted.82  The Report described the high frequency of force used in areas without 
surveillance cameras and found that the most egregious use of force incidents occur in those areas.83  
The consultant also reported that he had never witnessed a system with so much inmate-on-inmate 
violence, another contributing factor to inadequate protections for adolescents.84  As a result of excessive 
violence from both staff members and inmates, there are high numbers of serious injuries and inmates in the 
adolescent facility are significantly more likely to sustain a serious head injury than inmates in any other Rikers 
facility.85  These injuries include fractures, lacerations and contusions to inmates’ heads.86  These findings led 
the investigation to conclude that the DOC has insufficiently protected adolescent inmates from harm. 
2. The DOC System Contains Universal Deficits Resulting in a High Frequency of 
Inmate Violence 
The Report discussed how systemic deficiencies cause excessive force by DOC staff members and 
frequent inmate-on-inmate violence.87  These deficiencies include insufficient reporting of use of force 
incidents resulting in a code of silence, inadequate consequences for infractions, lack of a grievance policy for 
inmates, insufficient supervision of inmates and staff members, lack of professionalism, inadequate training 
                                                
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76  Id. at 11 n.15 (citation omitted). 
77 Id. (citation omitted). 
78 Id. (citation omitted). 
79 Samuels, Bharara, Powell, & Daughtry, supra note 1, at 4. 
80 Id. at 12.  
81 Id. at 17; The Report described one of the frequent times when force was used as punishment or retaliation. In June 
2012, two correctional officers beat Inmate G in an act of retribution for the mistaken impression that Inmate G had 
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and management deficiencies.88 
First, the Report highlighted the insufficient reporting of use of force incidents by staff members. 
The DOC policy on reporting use of force incidents states that all “[s]taff who employ or witness force or 
have been alleged to employ or witness force . . . shall prepare a written report concerning the incident based 
on their own observations and written independently from other staff members that were involved or alleged 
to have been involved in the incident.”89  Despite this, there is a powerful code of silence, and staff members 
frequently and deliberately ignore the policy.90  Because use of force incidents are under-reported, unlawful 
uses of force remain unknown and unimpeded.  Obstacles that impede use of force reporting perpetuate the 
code of silence.91 Surveillance videos frequently go missing.92  DOC staff members told DOJ investigators 
that they had lost 35 percent of incidents in the 200 samples used for the Report, but gave no explanation as 
to why the surveillance videos could not be located.93 
The Report also found that DOC systemically failed to conduct sufficient investigations of use of 
force.94  The Report found this to be one of the central causes for the widespread practice of excessive 
force.95  Use of force investigations occurring at both the facility level and the Investigation Division (ID) are 
conducted inadequately.96  Investigations were found to be untimely, as the average investigation time 
exceeded DOC policy requirements.97  Additionally, the criteria required to initiate an investigation is 
unclear.98  Investigations are conducted poorly99 and contradictory statements are often reconciled with a bias 
in favor of the accounts of correctional officers.100  The Report found that ID’s review of the facility-level 
investigation was superficial.101  Most investigations result in findings that staff members operated within 
DOC policy despite facts to the contrary.102  
In the rare times that investigations find that staff members inappropriately used force, the 
consequences are minimal.103  According to the consultant, in most correctional facilities, beating a restrained 
inmate, or using force and failing to report it, necessitates termination.104  In the Rikers adolescent jails, 
however, significantly lesser disciplinary measures are taken, sometimes resulting in no consequences at all.105  
Another systemic deficiency leading to excessive force by staff members is that there is no grievance policy 
for staff-on-inmate assault and harassment.106  A grievance system is important because it affords inmates an 
opportunity to raise concerns about their treatment.107 
The Report also found that the insufficient supervision of inmates is a systemic deficiency leading to 
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inadequate protection of inmates from harm.108  This is due to DOC staff members’ inexperience in the 
corrections system, lack of professionalism, inadequate training and inadequate monitoring of the most 
difficult adolescents in the jail.109  Staff members are particularly inexperienced, as the adolescent unit is the 
first assignment for DOC staff members after initial training. 110   Therefore, the most inexperienced 
correctional officers work in the most explosive environments with impulsive adolescents who have mental 
and behavioral issues.111  
The Report provided examples of DOC staff members’ unprofessionalism.  DOC staff members 
forced inmates to walk down the hallway undressed, punishment referred to as “walking down Broadway.”112 
Staff members spat on inmates’ food, refused to feed them, and threw away their property. 113  The 
investigation found that use of force training was inadequate and failed to address the most problematic 
practices on Rikers, including headshots and false reporting.114  The Report noted that the inadequate 
supervision resulting in the insufficient protection of adolescent inmates was not due to lack of resources or 
staff members, as there was nearly a one-to-one inmate-to-staff ratio in 2013.115  Additionally, the Report 
focused on management issues and their relation to the inability to protect adolescent inmates against harm. 
It first highlighted the difficulty of implementing any reforms to improve supervision of staff members due to 
the lack of stability in facility management.116  Lack of stability in leadership trickles down to the captains’ 
supervision of correctional officers, as each shift assignment involves a different captain supervising 
officers.117  When management fluctuates so frequently, there is little incentive to take responsibility for the 
jail’s problems. 
Another management deficiency results from the disconnect between DOC’s top administrators and 
staff members working in excessively violent jails every day.118  The consultant noted how striking the 
frequency of absence among administrators and head managers was. 119   The Report claims that the 
disconnect leads to noncompliance with use of force policies. 120  As a result, over the years, prison 
administrators have attempted to effect multiple reforms, but they have made no thorough or effective effort 
to change the culture of violence on Rikers.121  These management deficiencies illustrate the universal deficits 
in the DOC system, resulting in excessive force from staff members and a high frequency of inmate violence. 
3. The Rikers Island Adolescent Jails Have Excessive and Inappropriate Use of 
Extended Punitive Segregation  
The Report discussed the excessive and inappropriate prolonged use of adolescent segregation 
units.122  Adolescent inmates in punitive segregation spend 23 hours a day in six-by-eight foot cells.123  The 
guards give them one hour a day for recreation in chain-linked cages and access to a shower.124  DOC uses 
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punitive segregation excessively.125  The average amount of adolescent inmates in punitive segregation on any 
given day in 2013 was fifteen to twenty-five percent.126   
Five months after releasing the Report, New York City officials agreed to a plan to eliminate the use 
of solitary confinement for inmates 21 years and younger.127  The elimination of solitary confinement for 
inmates under 18-years-old and 18-year-old inmates with mental illnesses was required in the settlement 
agreement agreed upon in June of 2015.128  Officials banned the use of solitary confinement for adolescents 
based on the widespread agreement that punitive segregation had particularly detrimental effects on 
adolescents, as illustrated by Kalief Browder’s suicide, and increased inmate violence.129 The ban will take 
effect in 2016.130 
4. The Report’s Conclusion 
The DOJ investigation concluded:  
There is a pattern and practice of conduct at Rikers that violates the 
constitutional rights of adolescent inmates.  In particular, we find that 
adolescent inmates at Rikers are not adequately protected from harm, 
including serious physical harm from the rampant use of unnecessary and 
excessive force by DOC staff members.  In addition, adolescent inmates are 
not adequately protected from harm caused by violence inflicted by other 
inmates, including inmate-on-inmate fights.  Indeed, we find that a deep-
seated culture of violence is pervasive throughout the adolescent facilities at 
Rikers, and DOC staff members routinely utilize force not as a last resort, 
but instead as a means to control the adolescent population and punish 
disorderly or disrespectful behavior.  Moreover, DOC relies far too heavily 
on punitive segregation as a disciplinary measure, placing adolescent 
inmates—many of whom are mentally ill—in what amounts to solitary 
confinement at an alarming rate and for excessive periods of time.131 
The report proposed remedial recommendations and allowed the DOC 49 days to comply.132  In 
December 2014, unsatisfied with the city’s efforts to remedy the conduct that violates adolescent inmates’ 
constitutional rights, the DOJ joined the ongoing class action, Nunez,133 which alleges that the systemic 
pattern and practice of unnecessary force against all inmates on Rikers Island amounts to conduct that 
violates inmates’ constitutional rights.134 In June of 2015, the City of New York agreed to settle the Nunez 
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lawsuit.135  The limitations of the settlement agreement are discussed below. 
III. THE FEDERAL LAWSUIT’S ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY REFORM THE CULTURE OF VIOLENCE 
ON RIKERS ISLAND ADOLESCENT JAILS IS LIMITED BY THE POWER OF COBA 
This section outlines the limitations of the federal lawsuit.  First, the outcomes of federal lawsuits 
brought pursuant to Section 14141 and CRIPA, also known as institutional reform litigation, are outlined.  
Next, the limitations of institutional reform litigation are discussed and those limitations are applied to the 
situation on Rikers Island, with a discussion of COBA’s power.  
A. Outcomes of Institutional Reform Litigation 
Relief in institutional reform litigation can come in the form of Investigative Findings Letters, 
consent decrees, and memoranda of agreements (“MOAs”).136  Investigative Findings Letters are merely 
advisory measures—whether or not an institution decides to implement recommendations is optional.137  The 
policies and procedures outlined in consent decrees and MOAs carry more force.  They attempt to improve 
management and control officer conduct.138  Consent decrees and MOAs are created through negotiations 
between the court and all interested parties.139  While a consent decree does not maintain the force of law, it 
“constitutes a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort 
for guidance.”140 
Consent decrees and MOAs involve common sets of required reforms including improving use of 
force directives, grievance systems, training, 141  and the appointment of an independent monitor. 142 
Independent monitoring bodies oversee the enforcement of consent decrees and MOAs, and determine if the 
defendant institution is in compliance. 143  Independent monitors actively participate in reforms by 
investigating and reporting to the court and public.144  They provide support, reassurance and warnings for 
the defendant institution.145  Consent decrees and MOAs usually last five years and terminate when the 
independent monitor determines that the institution has met the conditions outlined by the court.146  The 
successful enforcement of consent decrees or MOA recommendations depend on effective leadership.  In 
order to create meaningful reform in law enforcement and corrections departments, there must be not only a 
change in formal procedures, but also a change in culture and organizational values—something that begins 
from the top-down.147  
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B. The Nunez v. City of New York Settlement Agreement 
 
In October of 2015, the Honorable Laura Taylor Swain, Federal District Court Judge, gave final 
approval of a settlement agreement over the Nunez federal lawsuit regarding the culture of violence on Rikers 
Island.148  The settlement resulted in a federal consent decree, requiring the DOC to revamp and implement 
numerous new practices, systems, policies and procedures in order to protect the constitutional rights of 
inmates with a close focus on adolescent inmates.149  The agreement will remain in effect until the court finds 
the City has been substantially compliant with the its terms for 24 months.150 
 
The reform measures attempting to end the culture of violence on Rikers Island required by the 
settlement agreement include: the appointment of an independent monitor; the creation of a new use of force 
policy, reporting requirements and improvements in use of force incident investigations; increased staff 
member accountability; increased video surveillance of jails; improved tracking systems and the development 
of an Early Warning System (EWS); improvements in staff member training; and a myriad of provisions 
particularly for adolescent inmates.151  Each of these requirements is discussed further below.  
1. Appointment of an Independent Monitor 
The Nunez settlement agreement requires New York City to fund an independent federal monitor 
named Steve J. Martin who will report to Judge Swain and regularly assess DOC’s compliance with the 
conditions of the settlement.152  Martin is a former correctional officer and General Counsel of the Texas 
State Prison System.153  He has 40 years of professional experience in the corrections department, has served 
as a federal independent monitor in various prisons and state systems and as an expert consultant for the 
DOJ.154 
 
The monitor is required to create a monitoring plan to assess DOC’s compliance.155  The monitor 
will review all DOC policies and is granted access to the jail, and non-privileged DOC records and 
documents. 156   The monitor will be permitted to interview inmates and staff members protected by 
confidentiality requirements, away from other staff members (including supervisors).157  
2. Creation of a New Use of Force Policy, Reporting Requirements and Improvements 
in Use of Force Incident Investigations 
A crucial part of the settlement is its focus on revamping the use of force policy, incident reporting 
requirements and incident investigations.  First, the DOC is required to create a comprehensive use of force 
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policy to be reviewed and approved by the monitor.158  The new policy must emphasize when the use of 
force is permissible and impermissible,159 and the duty of DOC staff members to protect inmates from 
harm.160  The policy also requires explicit bans on blows to the head, face and areas of the body as well as 
bans against chokeholds and kicks.161  Force is also prohibited as a means to punish, retaliate against or in 
response to threats or insults from inmates.162  
 
To improve use of force reporting, DOC staff members are required to write reports independently 
of other staff members that may have witnessed or have been involved in use of force incidents, with a 
prohibition against collusion.163  Medical staff must report when an inmate has suffered an injury and whether 
the medical staff suspects it may have been caused by a use of force incident not reported.164  With the help 
of the monitor, the DOC is required to create an Anonymous Reporting System enabling DOC staff 
members to report use of force violations to a centralized reporting system.165  
 
To address the deficiencies in use of force investigations, the DOC is required to conduct “thorough, 
timely and objective investigations into use of force incidents.”166  From these investigations, DOC staff must 
summarize their findings, determine whether a use of force policy was violated, and recommend remedial or 
disciplinary actions.167  To improve investigations concerning adolescent inmates, the settlement requires the 
designation of a “Youth ID Team,” specifically for the investigation of use of force incidents involving 
inmates under 18 years-of-age.168  
3. Increased Staff Member Accountability 
The DOC is required to increase staff member accountability through various measures including, 
requirements to create a new Use of Force Auditor position, by sending notifications to the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, and improving staff recruitment, selection and promotion.  The DOC is required to “take necessary 
steps to impose appropriate and meaningful discipline,” and termination must be a possible consequence for 
a violation of the use of force policy and for failure to report use of force incidents.169  If a staff member uses 
force over three times within a six-month period,170 jail wardens must refer to the staff members’ use of force 
history to determine whether counseling is needed.171  DOC, with the help of in the independent monitor, 
must create comprehensive and standardized disciplinary guidelines with discipline for use of force 
violations.172  
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The new Use of Force Auditor position is required to report to the Commissioner, analyze all use of 
force data and submit quarterly reports.173  The DOC is required to “promptly” notify the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office if a staff member’s conduct in a use of force incident appears to be criminal.174 
 
In order to improve staff recruitment, selection and promotion, the DOC must implement various 
measures.  First, they must create a staff recruitment program to attract qualified applicants selected through 
an “objective” process and subject applicants to a criminal background check.175  To improve DOC staff 
promotions, the settlement requires the DOC to review the staff member’s involvement in use of force 
incidents and verify there is no cause for concern in his or her qualifications for promotions to Captain or 
higher.176 
4. Increased Video Surveillance of Jails 
The settlement agreement also requires the installment of comprehensive video surveillance of the 
jails including, the implementation of a body worn camera pilot program and requirements for use of force 
hand-held video cameras.177  The DOC is required to install a minimum of 7,800 additional wall-mounted 
surveillance cameras by February 2018, with a goal of obtaining complete coverage of the jails with some 
narrow exceptions.178  Additionally, the settlement agreement requires a pilot program using 100 body worn 
cameras worn by DOC staff members in areas of the jail that have high frequencies of violence.179  Further, 
DOC is required to develop and implement policies concerning hand-held video cameras requiring staff 
members to record situations such as responses to use of force incidents.180   
5. Improved Tracking Systems and the Development of EWS 
The settlement agreement requires the DOC to improve tracking through the use of enhanced 
computerized systems and the development of EWS.181  The computerized tracking systems are required to 
track data on use of force incidents, investigations and disciplinary actions imposed on staff members for 
violations.182  The development of EWS is subject to approval and periodic review of the monitor,183 and is 
created to identify staff members in need of corrective action184 and to track use of force incidents.185 
6. Improvements in Staff Member Training 
The DOC is required to work with the monitor to develop new training programs in various areas 
including, use of force policies, crisis intervention and conflict resolution, probe team training, and direct 
supervision training. 186   The DOC and monitor are also required to work together to improve the 
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effectiveness of existing training policies including, defensive tactics, cell extraction and investigator 
training. 187  Additionally, all staff members working regularly with adolescent inmates are required to 
complete training focusing on conflict management and crisis intervention skills specific to the adolescent 
population as well as strategies to manage adolescent inmates with mental illnesses and suicidal behaviors.188 
7. Provisions for Adolescent Inmates 
There are various provisions within the settlement agreement that specifically focus on the treatment 
of adolescent inmates.  Such inmates are called “Young Inmates” and are defined as under the age of 19 
years-old.189  Among the relevant provisions are the requirements to improve the supervision of young 
inmates, review inmate disciplinary policies, identify an alternative housing site for adolescent inmates, and as 
mentioned above, a prohibition against the use of punitive segregation.190 
 
In order to improve the supervision of young inmates, the DOC must meet certain inmate-to-staff 
ratio requirements, perform daily inspections of young inmate housing areas, develop and implement a 
“direct supervision model” to prevent inmate-on-inmate conflicts by requiring frequent interactions between 
inmates and DOC staff members.191  The settlement agreement also requires the DOC to appoint an outside 
consultant to review the DOC infraction policies.192  The consultant must make recommendations, which the 
DOC is required to implement unless doing so would be unduly burdensome.193  Finally, the agreement 
requires the DOC, the monitor and the Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice to make “best efforts” to remove 
adolescent inmates from Rikers Island by finding an alternative placement for such inmates.194  The new site 
must provide access to recreational and education services, and public transportation for adolescent inmate 
family members.195 
  
The settlement agreement demands many changes on Rikers Island.  While Judge Swain championed 
the agreement as a model for correctional departments across the country,196 creating meaningful change on 
Rikers Island is a daunting task and violence continues.197  The requirements in the settlement agreement 
reflect the common sets of requirements in consent decrees, such as improving use of force directives, 
grievance systems, training and developing EWS.  Such measures have a history of failing to create 
meaningful reform.  Moreover, reform efforts outlined in the settlement underestimate the power of COBA 
whose members are tasked with implementing such efforts into operational policy. 
C. Limitations of the Nunez v .  Ci ty  o f  New York  Institutional Reform Litigation and the Power 
of COBA  
While one should not undervalue the extent to which Section 14141 or CRIPA brought about 
success and valuable institutional reform litigation, such efforts suffer from significant limitations in actually 
protecting the constitutional rights of inmates on Rikers Island.  The failure of reform initiatives prior to the 
settlement agreement and long history of use of force lawsuits to protect inmates’ constitutional rights 
underscore these limitations.  There are numerous systemic disincentives throughout DOC operations that 
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create significant impediments to reform efforts.  These disincentives include the jail’s primary concern of 
maintaining order and the status quo, dynamics on the ground-level, civil services laws, COBA, and COBA’s 
president, Norman Seabrook. 
1. Failure of Recent Reform Initiatives and the Long History of Lawsuits 
The Report included recent initiatives198 to address the problem of inappropriate use of force and 
lack of accountability.  In doing so it illustrated the limitations of consent decrees resulting from institutional 
reform litigation.  These initiatives included (1) the creation of a hotline that provides inmates with the 
opportunity to anonymously report abuse, and (2) the addition of new management positions in adolescent 
facilities, such as a Deputy Warden for Adolescents and an Integrity Control Officer.199  The Report’s 
findings and the persistence of the code of silence illustrate the failure of these reform efforts. 
In addition to the recent initiatives, there is a long history of use of force lawsuits failing to protect 
inmates’ constitutional rights on Rikers Island.  The DOC has been involved in six class-action lawsuits 
involving excessive use of force from the 1980’s until Nunez.200  Both Nunez and each case before has settled, 
agreeing on limited injunctive relief and specific reforms regarding use of force policies and practices.201  
These past efforts were not sustainable, and Nunez alleges their demise.202  
The court cannot effectively reform the culture of violence in correctional facilities on its own.  
While the independent monitor is meant to ensure implementation by acting as an officer of the court, even 
this presents limitations to actual enforcement of reforms.  In order to create lasting reform, adherence from 
the top down–from both managers and officers–is required.203  The culture of violence perpetrated by the 
lowest-rank-and-file DOC staff members up to the Corrections Commissioner frustrates consent decree and 
enforcement efforts.  This is because the ultimate responsibility for translating a consent decree into enforced 
operational policy falls on the officials within the institution.204  If the internal culture does not tolerate or 
encourage compliance, it is unlikely that officers will carry out the letter or spirit of the directives.205  The 
failure of reform efforts to translate into a new internal culture resulted in recent initiatives and six class-
action lawsuits against DOC. 
2. The Primary Concern of Jails Hinders Reform Efforts 
Maintaining order and the status quo is the primary concern of jails.  This hinders reform and 
perpetuates the culture of violence in adolescent inmate facilities.  Because the primary concern is maintaining 
order and the status quo, every situation is treated as if it may escalate and explode.206  There is an ever-
present threat of violence and disorder in adolescent jails, resulting in extreme measures that harm inmates.207 
Guards are evaluated on their ability to control inmates and maintain order.208  Therefore, progression in 
officers’ careers may depend on proving they are tough and able to control inmates, incentivizing excessive 
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force.209  The costs of maintaining the status quo and disregarding consent decree orders are not as significant 
as the costs associated with the uncertainty of complying with such orders.210  Thus, the incentive system on 
Rikers Island reinforces the status quo.211  
3. Disincentives on the Ground 
A correctional officer on Rikers Island may have few incentives to implement Nunez reforms because 
the net expected cost of complying with, for example, a new use of force directive, may be greater than 
continuing to use excessive and unnecessary force.   There are many reasons an officer may use excessive 
force, including fear for life or of serious bodily injury, desire for revenge, failure to understand a use of force 
policy, or simply because it is more expedient to use force than it is to ensure cooperation.212  In these 
situations, and especially when an officer fears for his or her life, the potential costs of complying with 
consent decree orders and implementing reforms are much greater than the certainty of not complying and 
continuing to use excessive force.213  Therefore, the settlement agreement’s requirements calling for a new 
comprehensive use of force policy, even one that explicitly bans certain use of force techniques214 and has 
disciplinary policies that call for potential termination for use of force violations,215 does not necessarily 
guarantee an effect in operations on the ground due to strong disincentives such as fear for life or serious 
bodily injury.  Ultimately, these requirements are just words on paper unless they are actually implemented by 
DOC staff members. 
Supervisors are incentivized to hide facility conditions from the courts to avoid further court 
intervention.216  There are few incentives to identify problems and take responsibility for fixing them and it is 
easier to turn a blind eye.217  The costs of managing a facility that adequately reports and holds staff members 
accountable are greater than never identifying problems.  Therefore, the measures required by the settlement, 
including suggestions to ensure staff members involved in use of force incidents write reports independently 
of other staff members,218 are unlikely to be enforced because doing so would cost more than maintaining the 
status quo.  It is important to note that the old use of force reporting policy had a similar requirement that 
staff members report use of force incidents independently and such requirement was frequently ignored.219  
Additionally, the requirement that the DOC conduct “thorough, timely and objective investigations into use 
of force incidents,”220 will likely have a minimal effect. Such policy is similar to the old policy, which resulted 
in superficial, backlogged investigations.221  Policies like these and many others were ignored before the 
settlement and are unlikely to be enforced through the consent decree.  For DOC staff members on the 
ground, complying with the settlement agreement is likely to cost more than maintaining the status quo.  
4. Recent Promotions within the DOC Illustrate the Disincentives 
During the DOJ investigation of the adolescent facilities on Rikers Island, the warden and deputy 
warden at the time, William Clemons and Turhan Gumusdere respectively, were responsible for omitting 
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hundreds of inmate fight records.222  In May of 2014, the Commissioner, Joseph Ponte, promoted Clemons 
to chief of the department and highest-ranking uniformed officer.223  The Commissioner also promoted 
Gumusdere to warden of the largest jail on Rikers Island.224  The Report noted that both Clemons and 
Gumusdere “abdicated responsibility” for reporting violence and “turned a blind eye” to submitted falsified 
reports. 225  The DOJ recommended the demotion of both Clemons and Gumusdere. 226  Instead, 
Commissioner Ponte, appointed by Mayor de Blasio,227 promoted officers who encouraged the code of 
silence.  Clemons has since retired, likely due to public outrage.228  However, Commissioner Ponte maintains 
that both Clemons and Gumusdere demonstrated “exemplary leadership” and were “fully committed to the 
department’s reform agenda.”229  Therefore, the settlement agreement’s requirements, such as the attempt to 
increase staff member accountability by requiring jail wardens to refer to a staff member’s use of force history 
and determine whether counseling is needed, 230 will likely have a minimal effect since the wardens renounce 
reform efforts and promote the code of silence themselves.  
The settlement agreement also seeks to remedy this problem with the requirement that the DOC 
review staff members’ history of use of force incidents during promotional considerations and verify there is 
no cause for concern in his or her qualifications for promotion.231  Such determinations are ultimately made 
by Commissioner Ponte, who has already shown disregard for reform efforts.  Further, the settlement 
agreement allows Commissioner Ponte to determine “exceptional circumstances exist,”232 bypassing the rule 
and allowing the promotion regardless of a history of excessive use of force.  The Commissioner of 
corrections from 2003 to 2009, Martin F. Horn, admitted that Commissioner Ponte does not have many 
options to choose from when looking to promote leaders likely to enforce reforms.233  When such disregard 
for DOC rules and management, as exhibited by Commissioner Ponte, is valued throughout the department, 
young officers learn to emulate such practices.  Consequently, the culture of violence and code of silence 
persists throughout the system.  The promotion of Clemons and Gumusdere indicates that leadership 
rewards turning a blind eye to the use of excessive force by officers, underscoring the obstacles to meaningful 
reform. 
5. Disincentives from Civil Service Laws 
Civil service laws also have significant effects on correctional officers’ behavior, thereby hindering 
reform efforts.  Civil service laws dictate the recruiting, promoting, demoting, transferring, and terminating of 
public employees including correctional officers.234  Most significantly, civil services laws, such as Section 9-
117(b) of the New York City Administrative Code, place significant hiring restrictions on DOC staff 
members.235  These laws make it difficult for corrections departments to hold staff members accountable by 
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managing, disciplining or terminating officers.236  Therefore, DOC staff members, backed by civil service 
laws, will likely oppose fitness assessments for staff members that use excessive or unnecessary force, and will 
likely strongly oppose the creation of tracking systems such as EWS. 
6. Disincentives from COBA and Norman Seabrook  
Unions play a significant role in the creation of the Civil Service laws that hinder reform efforts,237 as 
they have considerable influence over executives, legislators and judges.238  COBA has a strong interest in the 
state laws that regulate Civil Service law and funding for correctional officers and contributed $500,000 to 
political campaigns in 2012, the majority of which went to legislative elections.239  
For the past two decades, COBA’s president, Norman Seabrook, has gained immense control over 
the DOC and outmaneuvered many mayors and commissioners.240 Former DOC commissioner Martin F. 
Horn commented that DOC wardens believed Seabrook exerted more control over their careers than he did 
as commissioner.241  Seabrook’s leadership has been instrumental in the large gains in salaries and pension 
benefits that correction officers have recently received.242  Seabrook gained his power through relations with 
commissioners, high-ranking corrections leaders and most recently, Mayor de Blasio.243 He also exerts public 
influence on his radio show.244  While Seabrook’s influence has greatly benefitted DOC staff members, it has 
also helped feed the culture of violence on Rikers by undermining accountability and hindering reform.245 
Seabrook influences the political process by exerting power over DOC. Seabrook prevented 
hundreds of inmates from attending their court dates to bar an inmate from giving testimony that would help 
convict a correctional officer in a brutality case.246  Seabrook prevented buses from taking inmates off the 
island, which effectively shut down the city’s courts.247  In 1993, before he became president, Seabrook and 
200 DOC staff members blocked off the bridge that connects Rikers Island to Queens in a protest against 
contract negotiations.248  Seabrook imposes significant costs on not only DOC leadership and staff members 
for complying with reform efforts, but also on the political process and public at large.  
Seabrook’s ability to force out the chief investigator of the DOC, Florence Finkle—someone who 
began exposing and disciplining prison officials who brutalized inmates—illustrates his ability to stall 
reform.249  Seabrook harassed Finkle by unexpectedly visiting her office and criticizing her on his radio 
show.250  Seabrook ultimately replaced her with one of his childhood friends, Michael Blake.251  Seabrook 
vehemently resisted harsher disciplinary measures for DOC staff members who used excessive force.252  
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Like Finkle, guards have few incentives to follow reform efforts.253  The union vehemently resists 
high-ranking officials who attempt to implement disciplinary measures.254  If officers do follow reform efforts 
against the wishes of the union, they are often informally disciplined.255  Seabrook gains much of his influence 
as a result of fear he instills in others who go against him, and this influence frustrates reform efforts.256 
7. Empathy Does Not Incentivize Reform: The Phenomenon of Black on Black 
Violence 
DOC staff members’ lack of empathy for adolescent inmates is an interesting phenomenon, as they 
often come from the same neighborhoods and communities as the inmates they oversee.  As mentioned in 
the introduction, 95 percent of the adolescent population on Rikers Island is Black or Latino.257  In 2010, 
two-thirds of the 800 16- and 17-year-olds incarcerated in New York were Black.258  The overwhelming 
majority of COBA members, including Seabrook, Clemons and Blake, are Black.259  Other Black minorities 
from the same disenfranchised communities perpetuate the pervasive devaluing of minority youth’s lives. 
Both the DOC staff employed on Rikers Island and adolescents inmates come from marginalized, 
low-income communities of color that lack resources and opportunities.  Concentrated poverty and failing 
schools in these neighborhoods make both crime and the dangerous and difficult work of a correctional 
officer appealing.  Becoming a DOC staff member only requires a high school diploma, but they benefit from 
job security, advantages from their union, and a medium annual income of $57,100 with top earners receiving 
$72,000.260  This kind of job is appealing to low-income minorities isolated in neighborhoods where 
opportunity is scarce.  These communities are desperately trying to live out the American dream and make 
due with the resources they have.  Some end up on Rikers Island because they are charged with a crime, 
others end up there because of the benefits of holding such a difficult and dangerous job. 
Seabrook grew up in a low-income family of eight children in the Bronx.261  Much like the adolescent 
inmates on Rikers Island, Seabrook was a troubled youth and was committed to a juvenile center.262  Despite 
this fact, Seabrook advocates for DOC staff members at the expense of adolescent inmates.263  He expresses 
no empathy towards the adolescent population that is markedly similar to the young man he was growing 
up.264  One may think that the commonality of backgrounds would provide DOC staff members with the 
ability to recognize the humanity in adolescent inmates on Rikers Island.  Commonalities among guards and 
inmates that could potentially result in empathy are overshadowed by Black-on-Black violence.  Thus, 
empathy does not act as an incentive for reform.  
IV. IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ADOLESCENT INMATES ON 
RIKERS ISLAND, NY PENAL LAW SECTION 30.00 AND SECTION 9-117(B) OF THE NEW YORK 
CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE MUST BE AMENDED  
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This section proposes that protecting the constitutional rights of adolescent inmates on Rikers 
Island’s depends on statutory amendments within NY Penal Law Sec. 30.00 and Sec. 9-117(b) of the New 
York City Administrative Code.  NY Penal Law Sec. 30.00 sets the age of criminal responsibility at 16 years. 
Sec. 9-117(b) of the New York City Administrative Code establishes that only uniformed force members are 
eligible for promotion within DOC.  
First, this section advocates for the amendment of NY Penal Law Sec. 30.00 and discusses reasons 
for doing so, including the widespread recognition of differences between adults and juveniles.  Next, this 
section addresses recent proposals to amend the law, and the counterarguments.  Then, this section discusses 
Sec. 9-117(b) of the Administrative Code, the problems brought about by the law and Mayor de Blasio’s 
proposal to amend the law, and various counterarguments.  Finally, this section outlines additional 
recommendations for improving the morale of DOC correctional officers.  
A. Amend New York Penal Law Section 30.00  
New York Penal Law Section 30.00 establishes the minimum age at which someone can be 
prosecuted for an offense in criminal court, or the age of criminal responsibility.265  It states that any person 
under the age of 16 who has allegedly engaged in conduct that would constitute a criminal offense is 
permitted to use infancy as a defense and adjudicate the proceedings for such offense in Family Court.266  Sec. 
30.00 has various exceptions for the use of the infancy defense.  For example, 13- to 15-year-olds are 
criminally responsible for second-degree murder.267  Fourteen and fifteen- year-olds are criminally responsible 
for first-degree kidnapping, arson, assault, manslaughter, rape, criminal sexual acts, aggravated sexual abuse, 
burglary and robbery. 268  Fourteen and 15-year-olds are also criminally responsible for second-degree 
burglary, arson, robbery, and for possessing machine guns on school grounds.269 
NY Penal Law Sec. 30.00(1) should be amended to raise the age of criminal responsibility from 16 to 
18.  This would effectively remove adolescent inmates from Rikers Island and place them under the 
jurisdiction of the Family Court, as “juvenile delinquents.”270  As a result, the Family Court would oversee 
their rehabilitation, precluding DOC staff from exacting violence against them.  
Family Court emphasizes rehabilitation as opposed to punishment.271  This focus is reflected in the 
dispositional placements available to youth adjudicated in Family Court, including Close-to-Home 
placements, which are similar to group homes within adolescents’ communities,272 and the Office of Children 
and Family Services placements.273  These facilities are designed for adolescents and are staffed by people 
who are trained to work with adolescents and understand their development and behavior.274  These settings 
are clearly more appropriate for 16- and 17-year-olds than the jails and prisons designed for adult offenders 
and staffed by DOC staff members. 
There is widespread recognition of the differences between youth and adult offenders, and the 
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necessity for different treatment that satisfactorily corresponds to the needs of youth.275  New York and 
North Carolina are the only two states that have failed to fully recognize such a distinction.276  Because of 
this, adolescent youth on Rikers Island are suffering.  They are subject to a multitude of abuses, usually in 
response to conduct that is typical adolescent behavior.  Further, as mentioned above, over 75% of youth on 
Rikers Island have not been convicted of a crime.277  Therefore, even the retributive theory, often used to 
justify punishment, cannot justify the culture of violence adolescent inmates experience on Rikers Island. 
The widespread recognition of the differences between adolescents and adults is reflected in a long 
line of Supreme Court precedent.278  In 2005, Roper v. Simmons held that the imposition of the death penalty 
on a 17-year-old juvenile offender violated the Eighth Amendment.279  The court reasoned that juveniles are 
“categorically less culpable than the average criminal” and outlined the differences between juveniles and 
adults contributing to the diminished culpability of juveniles.280  The court looked to the rest of the world and 
the national consensus rejecting the juvenile death penalty to inform its decision.281  The rationale behind the 
decision was based on the differences between adolescents and adults, contributing to the diminished 
culpability of adolescents.  The court discussed adolescents’ lack of maturity and under-developed sense of 
responsibility.282  The court noted that recognizing these differences justified affording fewer rights to 
adolescents, such as the right to vote, serve on juries, or to marry without parental consent.283  The court also 
discussed how adolescents are more vulnerable to outside pressures including peer pressure.284  Additionally, 
the court noted that the character of juveniles is not well-formed and their personality traits are less fixed, 
which also contributes to their diminished culpability.285  The court stated that for these reasons, juveniles are 
also less susceptible to deterrence.286  These differences justified treating adolescents and adults differently, 
and also barring the death penalty for juveniles. 
Graham v. Florida, Miller v. Alabama, and Jackson v. Hobbs reaffirmed the differences between 
adolescents and adults outlined in Roper.287  In 2010, Graham held that the Eighth Amendment does not 
permit sentencing a 16-year-old juvenile offender to life without parole for a non-homicidal crime, citing 
Roper’s reasoning.288  In 2012, it was held in Miller and Jackson that the Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory 
life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders.289  Both cases also cited the reasoning from Roper 
outlining the differences between adolescents and adults.290  
As shown from Supreme Court precedent, there is widespread recognition of the differences 
between adolescents and adults, leading to the diminished culpability of adolescents.  Because of these 
recognized differences, the overwhelming majority of the nation does not hold 16- and 17-year-olds 
criminally responsible.  However, New York has failed to follow the national consensus and continues to 
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subject adolescent inmates on Rikers Island to a culture of violence and conduct that violates their 
constitutional rights. 
Despite the fact that New York is virtually alone in setting the age of 16 as the cut-off age for 
criminal responsibility, recent reforms have indicated recognition on the part of the City of the differences 
between adolescents and adults, leading to differential treatment.  For example, Rikers Island houses their 
adolescent population in different jails than the adults.291  The separation of adolescents from adults indicates 
recognition of the differences between adolescent inmates and adult inmates and a need for their separation. 
New York also has recognized the need for a different treatment for adolescent and adult inmates, 
which is illustrated through the policy change eliminating solitary confinement for persons under the age of 
21.292  The extremely harmful effects that solitary confinement has on adolescents prompted this policy 
change.293  For example, adolescent inmates who have been subjected to solitary confinement suffer from 
severe psychological impacts, including suicidal ideations and other self-injurious acts, anxiety and trouble 
sleeping, post-traumatic stress disorder, irrepressible rage and psychosis (such as hallucination).294  Such 
resulting behaviors are caused by standard adolescent neurodevelopment. 295  The practice of solitary 
confinement has been found to increase aggressive, impulsive, violent and disobedient behavior in 
adolescents.296  Eliminating solitary confinement for inmates up to the age of 21 reflects New York’s 
recognition of the differences between adolescents and adults.  This recognition should extend to raising the 
age of criminal responsibility. 
The settlement requires the DOC and the Mayor’s office of Criminal Justice make best efforts to 
remove adolescent inmates from Rikers Island.297  However, this requirement does not extend to removing 
adolescents from the jurisdiction of Criminal Court.  While this reform recommendation and the specific 
focus on adolescents in many provisions of the settlement agreement clearly indicate recognition of the 
differences between adolescent and adult inmates and a need for differential treatment, there is no 
justification provided for why such adolescents should still continue to be held criminally responsible like 
adults.  Removing adolescents from Rikers Island while still holding them criminally responsible will not end 
the deep-seated culture of violence and code of silence perpetrated by DOC staff members in other contexts.  
Due to the institutional culture engendered by DOC staff members—who are supported by the powerful 
incentives to maintain the status quo outlined above— adolescent inmates are likely, even if removed from 
Rikers Island, to still be subjected to patterns and practices of unconstitutional conduct.  Therefore, in order 
to protect adolescent inmates’ constitutional rights, the age of criminal responsibility should be amended so 
that such inmates are not subjected to the oversight and culture of violence of DOC staff members. 
1. Proposals to Amend New York Penal Law Section 30.00 
New York’s Governor, Andrew Cuomo, recognizes the dire need to raise the age of criminal 
responsibility to 18-years-old.298  Governor Cuomo created the Raise the Age Commission and has proposed 
that the legislature amend NY Penal Law Sec. 30.00.  The plan proposes the gradual increase of the age of 
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criminal responsibility.299  In 2017, the age of criminal responsibility would be 17-years-old, and would go up 
to 18-years-old by 2018.300  Such juvenile offenders would be housed in state and privately-operated youth 
facilities.301  The plan would still allow for the criminal conviction of the most serious crimes, such as murder 
and other violent offenses, per judicial discretion.302  Governor Cuomo’s plan aims to decrease adolescent 
recidivism rates vis-a-vis reduced prison sentences and more court intervention for youth.303 
Another proposal in favor of supporting raising the age of criminal responsibility is the Record 
Expungement Designed to Enhance Employment Act (REDEEM Act), sponsored by Senator Rand Paul. 
The REDEEM Act, among many other things, incentivizes states to raise the age of criminal responsibility to 
18 years by giving preference for grant applications to states that have established 18 years as the age of 
criminal responsibility.304  Recent proposals brought by the Raise the Age Commission and REDEEM Act 
indicate the widespread recognition of a need to amend New York Penal Law Sec. 30.00. 
2. Opponents of the Amendment of New York Penal Law Sec.  30.00 
One of the main arguments against amending Sec. 30.00 is rooted in the public safety rationale and 
the “tough on crime” approach.  While this Note argues that the differences between adolescents and adults 
justify differential treatment, one could argue that such differences are aggravating factors, making 
adolescents more dangerous than adults.  Adolescents’ lack of maturity and under-developed sense of 
responsibility make them more prone to violence.305  Likewise, they are more prone to violence because 
adolescents are more vulnerable to outside pressures, and the character of their personality traits are less 
fixed. 306   These reasons could lead one to think that adolescents should be subject to the harshest 
punishments for the sake of deterrence.  
However, the high recidivism rates resulting from charging 16- and 17-year-olds as adults refutes 
these arguments.  As mentioned, the recidivism rates of adolescents from Rikers Island are high.307  The 
average number of previous admissions of youth to the Department of Corrections (DOC) in 2013 was 
1.02.308  These statistics indicate that being “tough on crime” does not increase public safety.  Further, studies 
from states like Connecticut and Illinois found that juvenile recidivism rates decreased when adolescents were 
given options other than the jails and prisons designed for adults.309 
It is worth noting that COBA is likely to be vehemently opposed to any proposals to raise the age of 
criminal responsibility.  Such initiatives would remove around 800 adolescent inmates currently under DOC 
oversight310 and would significantly affect employment positions COBA is likely to rigorously protect. 
Additionally, raising the age will not solve the underlying issue of the culture of violence and lack of 
accountability on Rikers Island.  Raising the age would only protect adolescent inmates and the constitutional 
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violations of adult inmates’ rights would persist.  As such, this Note proposes the amendment of Sec. 9-
117(b) of the Administrative Code to end the pattern and practice of conduct that violates the constitutional 
rights of all inmates on Rikers Island. 
B.  Amend Section 9-117(b) of the New York City Administrative Code  
Section 9-117(a) of the New York City Administrative Code outlines the composition of the 
uniformed force of the DOC and establishes that DOC staff members are limited to correctional officers, 
captains, assistant deputy wardens, deputy wardens and wardens. 311   Section 9-117(b) states that the 
composition of the DOC may only be altered by the creation of new positions within the DOC, which may 
only be filled by the promotion of DOC staff members.312  This provision prohibits the appointment of any 
person from outside the DOC to any position therein.313  Therefore, all uniformed officers within DOC 
started as correctional officers and spent years within the DOC moving their way up the hierarchy.314  
Section 9-117(b) creates numerous problems for the enforcement of reform initiatives. All DOC 
staff members have operated within the culture of violence present on Rikers Island, as allegations of 
brutality and corruption along the chain of command on Rikers Island have persisted for decades.315 
Therefore, it is challenging to find candidates for promotion that have not been tainted by the culture of 
violence and code of silence.  This dilemma is illustrated by the promotions of Clemons and Gumusdere.316  
Therefore, Section 9-117(b) creates a significant obstacle for meaningful reform on Rikers Island.  In order to 
avoid this obstacle, Section 9-117(b) should be amended to allow for the appointment of uniformed officers 
from outside of the DOC.  This will allow new people who have not spent years within the culture of 
violence to occupy leadership positions and implement meaningful reform. 
Mayor de Blasio has proposed amending Section 9-117(b) to allow for flexibility in promotion of 
leadership in order to effectuate significant and lasting change.317  However, he faces rigorous opposition 
from labor unions he has normally favored.318  In addition to the DOC, the amendment would affect the fire 
and police departments, which comprise a workforce of 350,000.319  This powerful municipal workforce can 
pressure City Council and the legislature, upon whom the approval of amending Sec. 9-117(b) depends.320 
1. Opponents of the Amendment of Section 9-117(b) of the New York City 
Administrative Code 
Those opposed to amending Sec. 9-117(b) highlight the negative impacts that changing Civil Service 
laws will have on the DOC functioning.  First, they argue that Civil Service laws like Sec. 9-117(b) of the city 
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Administrative Code safeguard against cronyism, inappropriate political influence and corruption.321  The 
laws seek to avoid the appointment, promotion or termination of employees based on their political 
affiliation.322 Such laws also support the balance between executive and legislative branches.323  
However, Civil Service laws like Sec. 9-117(b) have the opposite effect.  Sec. 9-117(b) promotes 
cronyism by significantly limiting the amount of candidates the Commissioner can promote to leadership 
positions,324 as illustrated by former commissioner’s comment about the difficulty commissioner Ponte faces 
in making promotional decisions.325  Actions on the part of Seabrook illustrate COBA’s inappropriate use of 
political influence and corruption, most blatantly in the instances when he shut down access to and from 
Rikers Island, and obstructed the functions of district courts.326  
Opponents also argue that changing Sec. 9-117(b) would jeopardize DOC staff members’ 
promotional opportunities and that DOC staff members know the system better than candidates from 
outside.327  It is clear that allowing the appointment of persons outside of DOC would create more 
competition for staff members within DOC.  However, if DOC staff members are not performing their job 
properly, for example by failing to protect inmates’ safety and constitutional rights, such staff members do 
not deserve promotional opportunities.  The mindset that staff members are entitled to promotions if they 
maintain the status quo is precisely what impedes effective reform.  
Similarly, it is clear that DOC staff members know the system well because they have worked within 
it for years.  However, that is precisely the problem that amending Sec. 9-117(b) seeks to resolve.  The fact 
that DOC staff members know the system well means that they have incentives to control the inmate 
population through unnecessary and excessive force, thereby obstructing any mechanisms to hold DOC staff 
members accountable.  Appointing persons from outside DOC would ameliorate the culture of violence and 
code of silence and pave the way for meaningful reform.  
2. Improving the Morale of DOC Staff members 
As this Note illustrates, the morale of DOC staff members is deeply troubled, and DOC staff 
members are not given the proper resources to improve their morale.328  We cannot hold DOC staff 
members accountable for the safety of inmates without providing them with the proper resources.  In order 
to really effectuate meaningful reform the treatment of correctional officers must also be addressed.  The goal 
of the amendment of Sec. 9-117(b) is to allow for flexibility in the promotion of high-ranking DOC 
leadership to improve the morale of DOC staff members and eliminate the pattern and practice of conduct 
that violates adolescent inmates’ constitutional rights.  Other initiatives can improve the morale of DOC staff 
members and contribute to the elimination of DOC staff members’ misconduct.  
Correctional officers in the DOC need mental health services.329  A study done by a psychologist in 
2013 found that 31 percent of correctional officers suffer from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) at a rate 
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similar to veterans returning from war.330  Additionally, 17 percent of correctional officers in the study 
suffered from depression in conjunction with PTSD.331  The study also found that correctional officers 
suffering from PTSD used alcohol more frequently.332  Correctional officers are 39 percent more likely to 
commit suicide than all other professions combined.333  Correctional officers are more likely to experience 
high-blood pressure, ulcers and heart attacks, contributing to a reduced life expectancy.334  Correctional 
officers are also more likely to get a divorce than the general population.335 
It is likely that the incredibly stressful environment correctional officers work in, coupled with 
inadequate mental health support, serve as contributing factors that explain why correctional officers violate 
the inmates’ constitutional rights through excessive and unnecessary force.336  While this Note focuses on 
protecting adolescent inmates’ rights, it is important to emphasize the need to also protect correctional 
officers by improving their work conditions.  This is a critical step in any effort to effect meaningful reform. 
DOC staff members need training to address not only inmates’ mental health issues, but also their 
own mental health needs.  Most correctional academies provide 16-week trainings on mental health.337  In 
New York City, correctional officers only receive 35 hours, much of which is focused on the mental health of 
inmates.338  The settlement agreement provides no requirements to improve mental health services for 
correctional officers.  Unless we provide DOC staff members with the resources they need, including 
adequate mental health support, holding them accountable will not necessarily get to the root of the problem. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In order to end the culture of violence on Rikers Island, legislators should amend New York Penal 
Law Sec. 30.00 so that 16- and 17-year-olds are placed under the jurisdiction of the Family Court.  Legislators 
should also amend Sec. 9-117(b) of the Administrative Code, which concerns promotional policies for DOC 
staff members.  While the Nunez federal lawsuit and resulting settlement agreement have served as a catalyst 
for reform, their effect on meaningful and lasting change likely will be minimal.  
Unless the proposed laws are amended, the patterns and practices of conduct that violate adolescent 
inmates’ constitutional rights on Rikers Island will persist.  The state of New York can no longer continue to 
subject minority youth to unconstitutional conduct.  Doing so endangers public safety and puts enormous 
strains on the state’s financial outlook.  It is an injustice to rip children from their families and hold them 
accountable before they have been found guilty of a crime, particularly when the nation and world at large 
recognize that adolescents have diminished culpability.  It is an injustice to correctional officers to subject 
them to the working conditions on Rikers Island without adequate resources.  It is an injustice to the shared 
communities of both the correctional officers and adolescent inmates to subject them to such horrific and 
inhumane circumstances.  It is an injustice for all to allow the culture of violence to persist on the hellhole 
that is Rikers Island. 
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